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Abstract—Protection of information against electromagnetic
eavesdropping is an important issue. Information may be de-
rivable from the shape of an unintended electromagnetic signal.
The resulting electromagnetic emanations can be correlated with
processing of classified information. The problem extends to
computer printers. This article presents a technical analysis of
LED arrays used in monochrome computer printers and their
contribution to unintentional electromagnetic emanations. We
analysed two printers from different manufacturers, designated
A and B. The forms of useful signals and their dependence on
parameters of printing data are presented. Analyses were based
on realistic type sizes and distribution of glyphs. Pictures were
reconstructed from received radio frequency (RF) emanations.
We observed differences in legibility of information receivable at
a distance that we attribute to different ways used by printer
designers to control the LED arrays, particularly the difference
between relatively high voltage single-ended waveforms and
lower-voltage differential signals. To decode the compromising
emanations required knowledge of—or guessing—printer oper-
ating parameters including resolution, printing speed, and paper
size. The optimal RF bandwidth for detecting individual pixels
has been determined. Measurements were carried out across
differences in construction and control of the LED arrays in
tested printers, and the levels of RF emissions compared for
selected operating modes (fast, high quality, or toner saving
mode) of the printing device.
Keywords: LED array, laser printer, unintentional emis-
sion, compromising emanations, electromagnetic eavesdrop-
ping, electromagnetic infiltration, recognition and reconstruc-
tion, non-invasive data acquisition.
I. INTRODUCTION
Printers are one of the basic elements of a computer system.
They translate the electronic form of processed data into
graphical form during the printing process. As with every
electronic device, printers are sources of electromagnetic em-
anations. Besides control signals, which carry no information
(e.g., directing the operation of stepper motors or heaters),
there are other signals (useful signals) that are correlated with
the information being processed. Such emissions are called
“sensitive” or “valuable” or “compromising” emanations from
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the point of view of electromagnetic protection of processed
information.1 Processed data may be information displayed on
a computer screen or printed (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Laser printer as a source of valuable emissions.
Like other devices included in a computer system [3], [4],
the printer can be subject to electromagnetic infiltration, or
eavesdropping [5], [6]. Therefore, efforts to reduce the level
of susceptibility to electromagnetic eavesdropping are initiated
for such devices. These are unintentionally radiated signals;
by ‘infiltration’ we mean exploitation of naturally occurring
intelligence-bearing modulation, not the introduction of delib-
erately induced vulnerabilities. It is more like ENGULF than
GUNMAN [1], [7]. Organisational and technical solutions2 are
the most often-used methods for limiting infiltration sensitivity
of devices [8]. Technical solutions are limited to changes in
the design of devices that typically increase the cost of such
devices and sometimes limit their functionality. Therefore, it
is desirable to find solutions that avoid these drawbacks and at
the same time allow “safe” processing of classified information
[9], [10].
One technical method that is commonly used in the field of
electromagnetic compatibility—both to reduce the amount of
1In fact, concern over compromising emanations from [electromechanical]
printing devices extends at least as far back as 1956 [1, [pp. 83–4, 109–111]
or 1917 [2, Chapter 13].
2An example of an organisational solution might be establishment of a
“control zone” around susceptible devices, relying on distance to attenuate
signals below levels that can be received outside the control zone.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
03
00
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  9
 A
ug
 20
18
2Table I
PARAMETERS OF USEFUL SIGNALS OF PRINTER A IN RELATION TO
PRINTING PARAMETERS.
Parameters of Useful Signal
Operating Mode Frequency (kHz) Amplitude (V)
300 dpi, Eco ∼ 4.7 3.5
300 dpi, Best ∼ 4.7 3.5
600 dpi, Eco ∼ 4.7 3.5
600 dpi, Best ∼ 4.7 3.5
1200 dpi, Eco ∼ 9.4 3.5
1200 dpi, Best ∼ 9.4 3.5
electromagnetic interference emitted from the device and the
susceptibility of the device to electromagnetic disturbance—
is the use of differential-mode signals. In this paper, analysis
of useful signals and control signals [11] in the operation of
LED arrays used in printers shows that such a design was
used by printer B in the operation of its photoconductor ex-
posure system. Is this sufficient, however, to foil non-invasive
information gathering? Research and results are presented in
this article.
The clear answer is that the solution adopted in the design of
the B printer (Figure 9b) significantly reduces the susceptibil-
ity of the device to infiltration, in comparison to the A printer
(Figure 9a). Moreover, the level of electromagnetic emission
of printer A is higher than that of typical single or dual diode
laser printers [12].
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE EMISSION SOURCE AND THE
CHARACTERISTICS OF USEFUL SIGNALS
The analyses were carried out on two printers using LED
array technology. Different ways of controlling the LED
array—chosen by the printer’s designer—affect the number
of useful signals (Figure 2) and the structure of those signals.
In the case of printer A we can distinguish four useful signals
and six control signals. The next ten wires are ground wires.
Printer B has eight useful signals (four differential pairs).
The other signals are control wires and ground wires (32
in all). By probing signal wires while exercising the printer,
we were able to learn the structure of the control signals, how
the LED array is controlled, and the way in which different
print quality options are achieved depending on the operating
mode and the “toner save” option. Each of the tested printers
uses different methods of controlling the LED array, which
can affect the level of electromagnetic emanations. Examples
of waveforms of useful and control signals for printer A are
shown in the oscilloscope traces of Figures 3–5.
The structures of useful signals, based on the example of the
signal on pin 2, does not change for the 300 dpi and 600 dpi
operating modes of the printer. In the case of the 1200 dpi
mode, the frequency of signal repetition increases by two. The
amplitude is constant at approximately 3.5V (Table I).
The structure of the signal (waveform shape and duty cycle)
doesn’t change. This proves that the level of risk of electro-
magnetic emanations correlated with the processed (printed)
information is not affected by printing quality (resolution and
toner save option), in contrast to the situation found with single
and dual diode laser printers [6].
(a) Printer A (b) Printer B
Figure 9. Two printers, A and B, were tested for sensitive emissions.
For these printers, changes of operating mode print quality
options do have an effect on the structure of useful signals
and thus the character of the source of sensitive RF emissions
[13], [14]. Information about the operating mode and print
quality for printer A is encoded in the structure of the control
signals (Figures 6–10). The amplitude of these signals is
approximately 4–5V. The pulse repetition frequency also
changes depending on operating mode and the toner save
option. But at the same time, these signals carry no information
about the information being printed [15], [16].
Moreover, the amplitude of the control signals is higher than
that of the useful signals. That could mean that control signals
could be considered as a serendipitous source of masking
emissions which disturb the reception of sensitive emanations.
This phenomenon is advantageous from an electromagnetic
protection point of view [17]–[19].
A completely different method of control of the LED
array was implemented in printer B despite using the same
xerographic technology of photosensitive drum. Here, some
information about modes of operation and toner save option
is visible in the useful signal. The amplitude of this signal is
approximately 250mV. The amplitude is less than a tenth of
similar signals in printer A. Moreover, the signalling method
is differential. Figures 11–14 show example waveforms of
useful signals. For these signals, the pulse repetition frequency
changes when printing mode of operation and printout quality
are changed (Table II). The structure of these signals (duty
cycle) does not change. By analysis of the parameters of
useful signals we can derive an important property crucial to
reconstructing images from intercepted RF signals that contain
printed data. In the case of printer B, a change of printing
quality (from Eco to Best and vice versa), for a fixed printing
mode, causes predictable changes of the pulse repetition rate
of the useful signal. For printer A, changes to these parameters
(printing mode and printing quality) are not reflected in the
behaviour of the useful signal.
3(a) (b)
Figure 2. Ribbon cable supplying useful signals to the LED array: (a) Printer A, (b) Printer B.
(a) (b)
Figure 3. Waveforms of useful signals on pins 2 (lower trace) and 5 (upper trace) of printer A for: a) the 300 dpi mode and the Best option, b) the 300 dpi
mode and the Eco option.
Table II
PARAMETERS OF USEFUL SIGNALS FROM PRINTER B IN RELATION TO
PRINTING PARAMETERS.
Operating PRF of differ- First Differential Second Differential
Mode (dpi, ential Signals Pair [1, 3, 5, 7] Pair [2, 4, 6, 8]
quality) (kHz) (mV) (mV)
600, Eco 2.07 −250 +250
600, Best 4.14 −250 +250
1200, Eco 4.14 −250 +250
1200, Best 8.28 −250 +250
III. RECONSTRUCTED IMAGES FROM SENSITIVE
EMISSIONS
Images of printed data were recreated from recorded (RF)
useful signals transmitted in the wires which supply signals
to the LED array. The test signal bandwidth was determined
according to the equation:
B =
W · L · (dpi)2
t
where:
B is the signal bandwidth for printing one pixel,
W is the width of the printing area in inches,
L is the length of the printing area in inches,
dpi is the printing resolution in dots per inch, and
t is the time to print one page.
We have to know the printing parameters to reconstruct
the original information. These parameters are: the length of
printer video line (in pixels), and the number of video lines
on a sheet of paper. As we can see, full reconstructed images
can have very large dimensions; for example, for:
• a resolution of 1200× 1200 dpi,
• printing speed of 30 pages per minute,
4(a) (b)
Figure 4. Waveforms of useful signals on pins 2 (lower trace) and 3 (upper trace) of printer A for: a) the 600 dpi mode and the Best option, b) the 600 dpi
mode and the Eco option.
(a) (b)
Figure 5. Waveforms of useful signals on pins 2 (lower trace) and 3 (upper trace) of printer A for: a) the 1200 dpi mode and the Best option, b) the 1200 dpi
mode and the Eco option.
• paper size of A4 (about 8.27 by 11.69 inches, that is
9924× 14 028 pixels), and
• three samples per pixel collected,
we obtain a data size about 450MB. Therefore, further ana-
lyses are based on fragments of images [20], [21].
Fragments of these images are presented in Figures 15
and 16. The reconstructed glyphs contained in the image are
constructed from horizontal lines at intervals equal to the width
of the line [8] apart from repetition frequency of the useful
signal and option Best or Eco and for the default printing
resolution of printer B.
In two-diode laser printers, a phenomenon occurs that
causes the reconstructed images from sensitive emissions to
contain only single points, corresponding to the beginning and
endpoint of each horizontal line comprising the printed glyphs
(essentially run-length encoding the reconstructed images)
[22].
However, these useful signals were not differential signals.
In the case of printer B, despite the predictable structure of
character glyphs, the differential signalling used tends to help
protect printed data against electromagnetic infiltration [23].
IV. LEVELS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC EMISSIONS
Printer B uses differential transmission of useful signals.
Its primary aim is probably to lower the levels of electro-
magnetic emission and increase resistance to external disturb-
ances. Since the useful differential signal is responsible for
the transfer of information from the printer’s raster image
processor (RIP) to the LED array, its characteristics correspond
to characteristics of the processed information. Therefore, the
solution adopted by the printer’s designer (in the form of a
differential signal) also reduces the levels of electromagnetic
5Figure 6. Waveforms of control signals on pins 6 (lower trace) and 9 (upper
trace) of printer A for the 300 dpi mode and the Best option.
Figure 7. Waveforms of control signals on pins 6 (lower trace) and 9 (upper
trace) of printer A for the 300 dpi mode and the Eco option.
emission correlated with printed data [24]. Such a solution
was not used in printer A, despite the fact that the amplitude
of useful signals are over ten times higher than in the case
of printer B. This necessarily translates into a level of elec-
tromagnetic emission. The number of wires carrying useful
signals is half that of printer B.
An anechoic chamber (Figure 17) was used to test the valid-
ity of the assumptions. During the tests, sensitive emissions
were measured with a bandwidth of 1MHz in the frequency
range from 2MHz to 1GHz. This frequency range was selec-
ted as a result of many years of experience in testing of laser
printers and display screens. The aforementioned bandwidth
value is the most effective for sensitive emissions from laser
printers. During the tests, a TEMPEST DSI 1550A receiving
system (20Hz–22GHz), which can be seen in Figure 18, was
used. The tested printers were connected to the TEMPEST
computer, which is certified for electromagnetic safety.
The reason for using the TEMPEST computer for this
purpose is because a typical computer has higher levels of
Figure 8. Waveforms of control signals on pins 6 (lower trace) and 9 (upper
trace) of printer A in 1200 dpi mode with the Best option.
Figure 10. Waveforms of control signals on pins 6 (lower trace) and 9 (upper
trace) of printer A for the 1200 dpi mode and the Eco option.
electromagnetic emissions. These emissions can “cover” the
target emissions. When that happens, the electromagnetic
infiltration process becomes impossible. Results of the TEM-
PEST measurements are shown in Figure 19.
V. SENSITIVE EMISSIONS
A. Printer A
The useful signals are sent by four wires. The parameters of
the signals are constant regardless of the printing mode and
toner save option. The only change relates to the frequency
of repetition of the useful signals for the 1200 dpi mode,
which is twice as high as for the two lower modes (300 dpi
and 600 dpi). The reconstructed images, regardless of the
operating mode of the printer, are visually similar, precluding
identification of the operating mode of the printer (Figures 20–
21). At the same time, the operating mode does not change the
radiated characteristic of the emission source or the level of
susceptibility to infiltration. In this printer, information about
printout quality is sent by additional control wires. In this
6Figure 11. Waveforms of useful signals (one of the differential pairs) of
printer B for the 1200 dpi mode and the Best option.
Figure 12. Waveforms of useful signals (one of the differential pairs) of
printer B for the 1200 dpi mode and the Eco option.
case, different printing modes generate control signals having
different timing structures.
As we can see, the xerographic technology of a photo-
sensitive drum illuminated by LED arrays, which is used in
computer printers, has significant characteristics from the point
of view of electromagnetic protection of the processed data.
The reconstructed data do not directly contain characteristics
that would facilitate their identification, as is the case with
conventional laser printers for the same printing modes [25].
Even the use of digital image processing—such as extension
of pixel amplitude histogram, pixel amplitude thresholding,
logical filtering, or edge detection filtering—doesn’t yield
satisfactory results [8], [26], [27].
B. Printer B
Printer B uses a similar xerographic exposure process
comprising a photosensitive drum as printer A. However, in the
structure of the original image, we can distinguish horizontal
gaps spaced at the same interval as one line—this is the Eco
Figure 13. Waveforms of useful signals (one of the differential pairs) of
printer B for the 600 dpi mode and the Best option.
Figure 14. Waveforms of useful signals (one of the differential pairs) of
printer B for the 600 dpi mode and the Eco option.
option in action—which has a positive effect on the level of
loss of distinctive features of the original signal after passing
through the side channel attack (SCA). This printer uses
differential signalling, which feeds into the SCA a much lower
amplitude original signal that is also missing some signal
features that would facilitate electromagnetic eavesdropping.
In order to prove the conclusions above, sensitive emission
signals were recorded, and then images reconstructed from
them. Undoubtedly the image contains some glyphs [28].
However, due to the elimination of a number of distinctive
features caused by differential transmission and reduction of
repetition frequency of the signal (Eco option), these elements
prevent reading any information related to the printed data
(Figure 22).
VI. CONCLUSION
This article presents the results of tests of useful and control
signals to the LED array for the A and B printers. The
7(a)
(b)
Figure 15. Examples of images reconstructed from useful signals (printer A) for (a) 300 dpi with toner save, (b) 600 dpi without toner save, and (c) 1200 dpi
with toner save.
tests were carried out from an electromagnetic-protection-of-
information point of view. The dependency of the structures of
signals on the printing mode and toner save option was shown.
In general, use of LED array technology in printers increases
the level of electromagnetic protection of information (as
compared to laser printers). The level of protection from
RF electromagnetic eavesdropping is greater than for printers
employing a dual diode laser system [29] and it does not
require changes of construction in the printers.
Printers using the dual diode laser system use serial signal
transmission. That solution is advantageous to the electromag-
netic eavesdropper (Figure 23).
Table III
COMPARISON OF THE QUALITY OF RECONSTRUCTED DATA—DEPENDING
ON RESOLUTION (DPI) AND THE USE OF “BEST” OR “ECO” OPTIONS—FOR
LASER PRINTERS THAT USE A DUAL DIODE LASER SYSTEM OR AN LED
ARRAY FROM AN ELECTROMAGNETIC PROTECTION POINT OF VIEW.
Legend:
K1 ONLY THE EDGES OF GLYPHS APPEAR IN THE RECONSTRUCTED
IMAGE, BUT THE INFORMATION IS LEGIBLE;
K2 VISIBLE FILLED GLYPHS APPEAR IN THE RECONSTRUCTED IM-
AGE, BUT THE INFORMATION IS NOT LEGIBLE;
W1 VISIBLE FILLED GLYPHS APPEAR IN THE RECONSTRUCTED IM-
AGE, AND THE INFORMATION IS LEGIBLE;
W2 GLYPHS IN THE RECONSTRUCTED IMAGE ARE NOT VISIBLE,
AND THE INFORMATION IS NOT LEGIBLE.
600 dpi 1200 dpi
Type of Printer ‘Best’ ‘Eco’ ‘Best’ ‘Eco’
Dual diode printer* W1 K1 W1 K1
Dual diode printer† W1 W1 K1 W1
Dual diode printer‡ W1 W1 W1 W1
LED array printerA K2 K2 K2 K2
LED array printerB W2 W2 W2 W2
*Producer 1 †Producer 2 ‡Producer 3
The LED array system requires parallel signal transmission.
This causes successful reception and decoding of sensitive
emissions to be very difficult. The reconstructed images from
valuable emissions obtained from LED-array-based printers
can be seen to contain glyphs, but they aren’t legible.
Printer B goes further by using differential signalling.
This method, once adopted, significantly reduces the level of
useful electromagnetic emission (from the perspective of an
eavesdropper) and thus reduces the effectiveness of receiving
emission sources. The reconstructed images cannot be read
by humans. Therefore the resistance level of printer B to
electromagnetic eavesdropping is much higher than printer
A—and that of typical laser printers (with dual diode laser
system). On the basis of recorded signals and reconstructed
images we may draw the conclusion that the method works.
However, the low quality of the recreated data stands in the
way of easy and simple interpretation.
The collected information related to printout quality and its
impact on the forms of recreated data are presented in Table
III. The results obtained by analysis of the A and B printers
were compared with results of analogous analyses of printers
using a dual diode laser system. In summary, the best approach
to increase resistance to electromagnetic infiltration is the LED
array system.
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(a) (b)
Figure 21. Fragments of reconstructed images from sensitive emissions of printer A: (a) 1200 dpi mode without toner save, (b) 1200 dpi mode with toner
save, measured frequency of sensitive emission: f0 = 525MHz, BW = 5MHz. Image is inverted.
Figure 22. Printer B with LED array, 600 × 600 dpi with toner save (image is inverted). Measured frequency of sensitive emission f0 = 384MHz,
BW = 2MHz.
Figure 23. Example of reconstructed image from sensitive emission for a two-
diode laser printer, 660 dpi mode with the “Eco” option turned on. Measured
frequency of sensitive emission: f0 = 444MHz, BW = 5MHz. Image is
inverted.
